Armor became central to North Vietnam’s war strategy as shifting communist diplomacy shaped Soviet support.
The People’s Army of Vietnam’s decision to utilize armor as part of its warfighting strategy was a product of various geopolitical factors that surrounded Hanoi during various parts of the Vietnam War. During the First Indochina War, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) emerged as the foremost communist benefactor of North Vietnam. The Soviet Union however, largely stood by. While worried by the PRC’s and Soviet Union’s actions during the Geneva Conference of 1954, Hanoi still felt the need to maintain good relations with both countries. This was reinforced when the Sino-Soviet split occurred in 1956 and Hanoi was forced to walk a tight rope between Beijing and Moscow. As the United States escalated its war in Vietnam, Moscow (now under new leadership) sought to increase its material support for Hanoi.
As the war progressed, Hanoi sought to fight larger battles against the Americans and their South Vietnamese allies. In order to fight larger battles, the PAVN needed more modern military equipment that only the Soviet Union could provide. This, paired with the chaos of the ongoing Cultural Revolution in China, led Hanoi to lean more towards Moscow in the latter years of the Vietnam War.
As part of this newly blossomed relationship, Moscow began to furnish the PAVN with more modern weapons including Soviet armor. Initially, the PAVN’s use of armor at Lang Vei (1968) and Laos (1971) was met with some success. However, in 1972, Hanoi panicked as the United States began to reach “détente” with Beijing and Moscow. This led to fears of another Geneva and thus lead Hanoi to pursue a rushed “Easter Offensive” in March 1972 which saw ill-trained PAVN tank crews fall prey to poor planning and bad strategy. This changed in 1975 when following the Paris Peace Accords and subsequent combined arms training in the Soviet Union, the PAVN victoriously drove its Soviet armor into Saigon.
Introduction
CHAPTER 1: The Rise and Fall of a Trilateral Relationship (1954-63) CHAPTER 2: Evolving Alliances & Shifting Strategies (1964-71) CHAPTER 3: The Easter Offensive of 1972 CHAPTER 4: The Paris Peace Accords and the Fall of Saigon (1973-75)
Conclusion
Jim Pomeroy has a BA in History & Political Science from James Madison University and a Master's in History with a Master's Certificate in Strategic Studies from Texas Tech University. He has also worked in the U.S. House of Representatives as a Congressional staffer. He currently lives in Roanoke, VA.
“Jim Pomeroy’s newest book provides a comprehensive understanding to key schisms and events within the communist world, shaping events on the battlefield. He painstakingly examines Vietnam’s military history and diplomatic history and, in doing so, efficiently and effectively connects these important topics.”
~Ken Rutherford, Professor of Political Science, James Madison University and co-founder of the Landmine Survivors Network, co-recipient of the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize as part of the global international campaign to ban landmines
“Alliances & Armor thoughtfully synthesizes the evolution of Hanoi’s military strategy in the Vietnam War and beyond. It offers particularly trenchant insights on the shift to Soviet-style warfare during the latter stages of the conflict.”
~Pierre Asselin, Professor of History and Dwight E. Stanford Chair in US Foreign Relations, San Diego State University
“When the Vietnam War is mentioned, visions of black pajama-clad jungle fighters come to mind. In truth, Hanoi won the war by employing large formations of tanks and infantry in conventional operations. In Alliances & Armor, James Pomeroy argues that there is a direct connection between diplomacy and tactics, maintaining that the evolving alliance between North Vietnam and the Soviet Union provided the impetus for Hanoi to shift from a Chinese ‘people’s war’ to more Soviet-style conventional tactics. Impeccably documented and effectively argued, this book is an essential addition to the historiography of the Vietnam War; it is highly recommended for those wanting to understand how and why the war evolved over time.”
~James H. Willbanks, PhD, Vietnam combat veteran and author of "Abandoning Vietnam" and "A Raid Too Far"
“Pomeroy vividly describes the evolution of Hanoi’s army from guerrilla bands to tank-led offensives, a development intricately aligned with North Vietnam’s turn toward the Soviet Union as the war progressed. Well-researched and hard-hitting, Alliances & Armor examines the process that led to the war’s final scene: a North Vietnamese tank crashing through the main gate of South Vietnam’s Independence Palace.”
~Dr. George J. Veith, author of "Black April: The Fall of South Vietnam, 1973–1975" and "Drawn Swords in a Distant Land: South Vietnam’s Shattered Dreams"
“Jim Pomeroy’s Alliances & Armor bridges the gaps between Cold War diplomacy and military operational history. With a firm grasp of multi-archival and secondary sources, Pomeroy provides a comprehensive look at the international issues that influenced Hanoi’s decisions in the Second Indochina War in a concise and deftly written narrative. This is a strong addition to the voluminous literature of the war in Vietnam.”
~Kelly Crager, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive
“… a worthy primer for those interested in understanding the evolution of North Vietnam’s way of war in the modern era and the close relationships between international politics, domestic policies, and a nation’s military strategy.”
~Parameters
“Pomeroy has made good use of North Vietnamese, Soviet, Chinese, and American sources and the extensive Texas Tech Virtual Vietnam Archive.”
~The VVA Veteran
“… a significant contribution to Vietnam War historiography, Cold War alliance politics, and the study of military operations. The book will be of particular interest to scholars of DRV foreign policy and Cold War international history, as well as to a broad student audience.”
~Journal of Military History
“… could easily be assigned in seminars on Vietnam War history, Cold War alliances, or in a staff college course on doctrinal diffusion.”
~Military History Chronicles